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Abstract
We develop an untyped semantic framework for the multiverse of set theory and show
that its proof-theoretic commitments are mild. ZF is extended with semantical axioms
utilizing the new symbols M(U) and Mod(U , σ), expressing that U is a universe and that σ
is true in the universe U , respectively. Here σ ranges over the augmented language, leading
to liar-style phenomena that are analysed.
The framework is both compatible with a broad range of multiverse conceptions and
suggests its own philosophically and semantically motivated multiverse principles. In par-
ticular, the framework is closely linked with a deductive rule of Necessitation to the effect
that the multiverse theory can only prove statements that it also proves to hold in all uni-
verses. We argue that this may be philosophically thought of as a Copernican principle that
the background theory does not hold a privileged position over the theories of its internal
universes.
Our main mathematical result shows that, for a range of semantical principles, the
framework’s proof-theoretic commitments are very mild, and thus not seriously limiting
to the diversity of the set-theoretic multiverse. Considering truth-in-all-universes as an
interpetation of the modal -operator, we show that our main semantical theory is consistent
with the modal logics T and Gdel-Lb provability logic, but not with S4. We conclude with
case studies applying the framework to two multiverse conceptions of set theory: arithmetic
absoluteness and Joel D. Hamkins’ multiverse theory.
1 Introduction
ZF set theory serves as a foundation for mathematics, but has also turned out to be interesting
in itself as a field of mathematical study. Much of the interest lies in that it raises questions
that are not only undecidable, but also lacking clearcut intuitive answers and demanding deep
mathematical developments. The continuum hypothesis is a primary historical example: It seems
implausible to reach a consensus on affirming or denying it, and it motivated both the inner model
and forcing break-throughs. It is natural to view these techniques as enabling constructions of
set-theoretic universes from other set-theoretic universes, thus taking a multiverse view of the
subject matter of set theory, rather than adopting the universe view that there is a single absolute
universe of sets. In the words of Hamkins, an advocate of the multiverse view [Hamkins, 2012,
p. 418]:
A large part of set theory over the past half-century has been about constructing
as many different models of set theory as possible /.../ Would you like to live in a
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universe where CH holds, but 3 fails? Or where 2ℵn = ℵn+2 for every natural number
n? Would you like to have rigid Suslin trees? Would you like every Aronszajn tree
to be special? Do you want a weakly compact cardinal κ for which 3κ(REG) fails?
Set theorists build models to order.
Hamkins follows this perspective on set-theoretic practice with his argument for adopting the
multiverse view:
This abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious difficulty for the universe
view, for if one holds that there is a single absolute background concept of set, then
one must explain or explain away as imaginary all of the alternative universes that set
theorists seem to have constructed. This seems a difficult task, for we have a robust
experience in those worlds, and they appear fully set theoretic to us. The multiverse
view, in contrast, explains this experience by embracing them as real, filling out
the vision hinted at in our mathematical experience, that there is an abundance of
set-theoretic worlds into which our mathematical tools have allowed us to glimpse.
To approach the set-theoretic multiverse mathematically, we need a foundational theory to
situate the universes in. Just as the foundational background theory of ZF is useful for studying
groups and topological spaces, it is useful for studying set-theoretic universes. Motivated by
the sophisticated model theory of first-order models of ZF available in the literature, this paper
essentially takes the universes to be such models. So we find ourselves in a situation of studying
models of ZF from the background theory ZF. The multiverse theorist may extend the background
theory of ZF to a multiverse theory (in an expanded language), with axioms specifying properties
of the multiverse. In such a background multiverse theory, it is natural to consider the universes
as themselves being models of multiverse theories, having their own internal universes, and so
on. This raises:
Main Question. What is the relationship between the external universe of the background
multiverse theory, and the universes internal to the background theory? (Similarly, what is the
relationship between each universe and the universes within that universe?)
We shall investigate several responses to the Main Question. Most fundamentally, the authors
suggest that the background multiverse theory ought to obey this principle:
Copernican Principle. The background theory of the multiverse should not have a privileged
position compared to the multiverse theories of the internal universes; specifically, the background
multiverse theory should only be able to prove statements that it proves to hold in all universes.
The name is borrowed from a methodological principle in physics, which Peacock states as
“that humans are not privileged observers”. For example, Peacock applies the principle arguing
“if the universe appears isotropic about our position, it would also appear isotropic to observers
in other galaxies” [Peacock, 1998, p. 66]. Similarly, the authors hold that if a statement about
the multiverse is justified (in the sense of being provable in an appropriate multiverse theory),
then it is justified from the vantage point of every universe in that multiverse. Below we explicate
a formal deductive rule, NEC, expressing this principle.
To approach the Main Question, we need a semantic framework that makes sense of the
notion of truth-in-a-universe. If the universes are mere models of ZF, then the usual |=-relation
suffices. But as soon as we consider each universe to contain a multiverse in its own right, it is
more natural to consider the universes as structures in the language of the multiverse theory.
The main contribution of this paper is an untyped semantic framework for handling the notion
of truth-in-a-ZF-universe. It is intended to be usable for just about any multiverse theorist of
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ZF set theory, giving a flexible packaged solution to the intricate technicalities that need to
be resolved for a straight-forward application of this notion. The primitive predicate M(U) is
introduced to express that U is a universe, and the primitive relation Mod(U , σ) is introduced
to express that the LMod-statement σ is true in the universe U , where LMod is the language of
set theory augmented with the symbols M and Mod. The multiverse theories considered in this
paper are expressed in LMod.
Now that the language LMod and the intuitive intended meaning of its symbols has been
briefly explained, the next task is to give natural and useful axioms for M and Mod. Giving
axioms for M is a sub-task of specifying non-semantical multiverse principles, for example the
multiverse axioms introduced by Hamkins in [Hamkins, 2012]. In this paper we are focused on
semantical axioms, meant to be applicable to a wide range of multiverse conceptions. Application
of this semantic framework to Hamkins’s multiverse is discussed in §6.2. Since Mod is an untyped
semantic relation, it is not surprising that it is exposed to liar-style phenomena. Our Theorem
4.6 shows e.g. that the schema
(
∀U (M(U) → Mod(U , pσq)
)
→ σ, over LMod-statements σ,
is inconsistent with the natural and mild semantical theory CM + NEC (see below), which is
conservative over ZF.
The basic semantical theory of untyped multiverse semantics introduced is called CM (stand-
ing for Compositional Multiverse semantics).1 CM is formed by first adding compositional se-
mantical LMod-axioms to the background theory ZF, for each logical connective and quantifier.
For example, the compositional axiom for ∧ is
if θ ∈ LMod is the conjunction of φ and ψ, then Mod(U , θ)⇔ Mod(U , φ) ∧Mod(U , ψ).
These are also called the Tarskian laws of satisfaction. The well-known Tarskian schema Tr(pσq)↔
σ does not make sense in the present framework, but analogues of Tr(pσq)→ σ and the rule of
Necessitation ⊢ σ ⇒⊢ Tr(pσq) are highly relevant. In CM we can prove the soundness princi-
ple that the set of statements true in any particular universe is deductively closed. Moreover,
CM contains an axiom called MultiverseZF saying that every universe satisfies ZF, which is just
intended to set the scope of the present treatment. (For most of the results, the authors believe
that natural generalizations to weak fragments of ZF are possible.) On the other hand, CM is con-
servative over ZF,2 so by the soundness principle, MultiverseZF, and Gdel’s second incompleteness
theorem, it does not prove the statement ∃U M(U), saying that there exists a universe.
A flexible revision-semantical technique for expanding models of the background theory ZF to
models of CM is developed. This technique builds on ideas from [Gupta, 1982], [Herzberger, 1982a]
and [Herzberger, 1982b], for circumventing truth-theoretic paradoxes. In short, one starts by set-
ting parameters specifying the particular multiverse conception desired. Among other things, this
pins down the interpretation of M. Then the interpretation of Mod is determined by a revision-
semantical process. Intuitively, a basic defintion of truth-in-a-universe is supplied among the
parameters, and this definition is revised step-by-step to more adequate definitions. It turns
out to be especially natural and convenient to iterate this process a non-standard number
of times, so it is actually suitable to perform the construction in an ω-inconsistent base the-
ory. This gives a striking connection with the Gitman-Hamkins model of the multiverse from
[Gitman & Hamkins, 2010], where every universe is a countable recursively saturated model of
ZFC. That said, the present framework is compatible with ω-consistent systems. As seen in Corol-
laries 5.3 and 5.4, the ω-consistent variants give local interpretability, while the ω-inconsistent
variants give full interpretability. These corollaries show that some natural settings of the pa-
rameters lead to that further semantically motivated axioms and deductive rules are validated
in the constructed model, more on this further below.
1The precise specification of CM is given in System 4.1.
2This follows from Theorem 5.1.
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We introduce several axioms and deductive rules addressing the Main Question above. The
most fundamental such principle for this framework is the deductive rule of Necessitation, NEC,
which is a formal expression of the Copernican Principle:
If σ is provable, then ∀U (M(U)→ Mod(U , pσq)) is provable,
where pσq is the Gdel code of σ. Under mild assumptions on the parameters, NEC is validated
in the revision-semantical model construction.
Dually, the deductive rule of Co-Necessitation, CONEC, says:
If ∀U (M(U)→ Mod(U , pσq)) is provable, then σ is provable.
In the context of NEC as formalizing the Copernican Principle, CONEC may be thought of
as expressing that the theory is maximal within the bounds of the Copernican Principle. On
the other hand, as a stand-alone principle, CONEC can be used to boost the expressive power:
For example, we will consider CM extended by CONEC and the Σ01-Absoluteness schema, which
expresses that no universe satisfies a Σ01-statement that does not already hold in the standard
model of arithmetic in the background theory; in other words, a Turing machine that does
not halt in the background theory, halts in no universe. (The converse of Σ01-Absoluteness
is straightforward to prove in CM, observing that the standard model of arithmetic in any
universe end-extends the standard model of arithmetic in the background universe.) In CM +
Σ01-Absoluteness we can use basic model-theoretic considerations to prove that every universe
satisfies the Reflection schema iterated ωCK1 times over ZF.
3 Now, by adding CONEC we can prove
ωCK1 -iterated Reflection schema over ZF outright in the background theory. So in general, CONEC
enables outright proofs of statements that are provably satisfied across a model-theoretically
delimited multiverse, thus in some sense “extracting the deductively accessible content” of higher-
order non-recursive properties.
We writeMS (Multiverse Semantics) for the theory CM+NEC+CONEC. This theory is analo-
gous to the the Firedman-Sheard theory of truth (FS) from [Friedman & Sheard, 1987]. The for-
mulation of FS in terms of NEC- and CONEC-rules appropriate for truth is from [Halbach, 1994].
A revision-semantical technique for constructing models of CM+NEC and/or CONEC (building
on a technique from the aforementioned two papers) is embodied in the Main Lemma (in §4)
and its Corollary 4.7.
We now proceed to discuss three axioms motivated by the Main Question that have a reflexive
character in that they assert that the background universe is in some sense represented in the
multiverse. We will establish proof-theoretic bounds on these in terms of iterated reflection
principles. The reader is referred to Systems 2.4 and 5.2 for the definition of these principles.
A very basic multiverse axiom is Non-Triviality, ∃U M(U), saying that there is a universe. In
the presence of NEC, this also yields that every universe contains a universe, and so on. We show
in Theorem 5.5 that CM + Non-Triviality + NEC proves the same set-theoretic theorems as the
theory of iterated consistency over ZF.
A stronger axiom motivated by Question 1, called Self-Representation, expresses that the back-
ground universe is isomorphic (over the set theoretic language) to one of the internal universes.
This embodies the idea that the universe of the backgound theory should also be represented in
the multiverse. It turns out to be convenient to take the universes to be countable recursively
saturated models when modelling MS+ Self-Representation, a phenomenon that corresponds to
the multiverse model of Gitman and Hamkins in [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010]. This suggests that
their multiverse theory would harmonize well with MS+Self-Representation, a hypothesis we will
briefly explore in subsection 6.2. In Theorem 5.6, we use the revision-semantical technique to
3See System 5.2 for the definition of this theory.
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interpret CM+ Self-Representation+ NEC in the theory of ω-iterated Global Reflection over ZF.
The latter is a natural untyped theory of truth, that mildly strengthens ZF. Self-Representation
may itself be thought of as a mild reflection principle.
We also introduce the axiom schema ofMultiverse Reflection, stating for each sentence σ in the
language L of set theory:
(
∀U (M(U)→ Mod(U , pσq))
)
→ σ. Over CM, this principle is implied
by Self-Representation and implies Non-Triviality. Using the revision-semantical technique, we
show in Theorem 5.5 that CM +Multiverse Reflection+ NEC is conservative over the theory of
ω-iterated Reflection schema over ZF.
There is a natural interpretation of the modal operators ,3, generated by interpreting σ
by ∀U (M(U) → Mod(U , pσq)). We investigate which modal principles are compatible with this
framework. On the one hand, we show in Proposition 4.8 that CM+Multiverse Reflection+NEC
validates the system T. On the other hand, in Theorem 4.9, we establish a number of limitative
results: In particular, over CM + NEC, K4 yields Lb’s axiom and thereby validates the Gdel-Lb
logic GL, which in turn is inconsistent with Non-Triviality, yielding that S4 is inconsistent over
CM+ NEC. Moreover, GL over CM is shown to be conservative over ZF in Theorem 5.1.
The body of the paper ends with case studies, where we look at two independent multiverse
conceptions through the lense of the semantic framework we have developed. The first of these
is a conception of the multiverse as being arithmetically absolute, in the sense that arithmetic
truth does not vary across the multiverse. The second is a conception due to Hamkins, which is
fundamentally based on the principles that the multiverse is closed under the forcing and inner
model techniques, and that every universe is countable and ω-non-standard from the perspective
of some other universe.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 A term-calculus for representation of syntax
We shall work with various recursively enumerable set theories, in languages obtained by adding
finitely many new non-logical symbols to the usual language of set theory on the signature {∈}.
We define a set theory to be any recursively enumerable system extending ZF in a language with
finitely many non-logical symbols.
Since we will be reasoning about syntactic objects, it is convenient to employ a Gdel coding
of syntax. Let K be a language with finitely many non-logical symbols. In any set theory T
(in language L) under consideration, we can define the arithmetic functions needed to formulate
a natural Go¨del coding in T of terms and formulae of K. Through the Go¨del coding, the
“grammatical structure” of K is coherently represented in T . The complicated details of this
procedure are described in any rigorous account of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. The gist
is that for each syntactic object (symbol, term or formula) s of K, there is a definable number
psq in L (the Gdel code of s), which represents s in T , and there are operations definable in
T corresponding to syntactic operations on such objects. The authors trust that the reader is
familiar with this.
It is customary in set theory to informally introduce constant, relation and function symbols
to the language, in order to make the presentation more readable. For example, one may use a
function symbol +, as if it belonged to the language and there was an axiom expressing that +
is addition on the finite von Neumann ordinals. In this paper we assume that a finite number
of such symbols needed for arithmetic and Gdel coding are present in the language of every
set theory. Here follows a semi-formal account of some of the main principles of this expanded
language L for a set theory T , also serving to specify the notation:
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1. We have a constant 0 and function symbols S,+,× for the successor, addition and multi-
plication operations in arithmetic. For each n ∈ N, n is shorthand for Sn(0).
2. Each variable, constant, relation or function symbol s ofK is represented in T by a numeral
psq in L.
3. Recursively, each term f(t1, . . . , tn) of K is represented by the term pfq(pt1q, . . . , ptnq) of
L. Formally, the term pfq(pt1q, . . . , ptnq) is the result of applying a function symbol of
L to the numerals pfq, pt1q, . . . , ptnq. Moreover, pf(t1, . . . , tn)q denotes a numeral that T
proves to equal pfq(pt1q, . . . , ptnq).
4. Each atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tn) of K is represented by the numeral pR(t0, . . . , tn)q of L.
Analogous remarks apply as in the case of terms described above.
5. The syntactic operations, standardly used to build up complex formulae from atomic for-
mulae, are all available. For example:
(a) L has a function symbol ¬. , such that for each φ in K, ¬. pφq represents ¬φ. Moreover,
T proves that p¬φq = ¬. pφq.
(b) L has a function symbol ∧. , such that for each φ and each ψ inK, pφq ∧. pψq represents
φ ∧ ψ. Moreover, T proves that pφ ∧ ψq = pφq ∧. pψq.
(c) L has a function symbol ∀. , such that for each variable v and each formula φ in K,
∀.pvq pφq represents ∀v φ. Moreover, T proves that p∀v φq = ∀.pvq pφq.
(d) For any φ in K, φ[t/x] denotes the formula obtained from φ by replacing each free
occurrence of the variable x by the term t (if t is a variable, then its bound occurrences
in φ are renamed as necessary). L has a function symbol (written −[−/.−]) which
represents this primitive recursive substitution operation. Moreover, T proves that
pφ(x)[y/x]q = pφ(x)q[pyq/.pxq]. Somewhat less formally, if φ has been introduced as
φ(x), we may write φ(t) for the formula φ[t/x].
In the context of a set-theory T in a set-theoretic language L, Σkn and Π
k
n denote the usual
arithmetic hierarchy, as defined up to equivalence in T . It is well-known that for any recursive
system S, there is a Σ01-formula PrS , representing S-provability in T , that satisfies Lb’s well-
known conditions. For example, for any S-formula φ, S ⊢ φ ⇒ T ⊢ PrS(pφq). We write ConS
for the sentence ¬PrS(p⊥q), expressing that S is consistent.
As an example, consider this consequence of Gdel’s second incompleteness theorem:
ZF 6⊢ ConZF
From the perspective of the meta-theory, the name ZF is used somewhat differently in its two
occurrences there. The first occurrence refers to a set of sentences (the object theory of ZF)
whereas the second refers to a formula representing the recursive set of Gdel codes of that set
in the object theory ZF. In analogy with the notational distinction between ∧ and ∧. above, one
might introduce a dot writing ZF 6⊢ ConZF. instead. In general we shall refrain from doing so,
relying on that the context determines the proper interpretation of the symbols. But on occasion
the more precise notation is utilized for the sake of clarity.
Suppose now that a set theory T ′ in language L′ is represented in a set theory T in language
L. Then L′ is Go¨del coded in T , as explained above. But T ′, in turn, also Go¨del codes languages;
say that T ′ Go¨del codes the language L′′. Note that the whole Go¨del coding of L′′ in T ′ is then
carried along by the representation of T ′ in T . For example, if φ is a formula in L′′, then there
is a term pφq in L′ which represents φ in T ′. If ψ(x) is a formula of L′, we can then form the
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formula ψ[pφq/x] of L′. This formula, in turn, is represented in T by an L-term pψ[pφq/x]q. So
if θ(y) is an L-formula, we can form the L-formula θ[pψ[pφq/x]q/y]. Thus, Go¨del codes may be
nested, as a set theory represents a set theory, which in turn represents a language.
2.2 Miscellaneous logical preliminaries
L is the language with the symbol “∈” along with a finite number of arithmetic and syntactic
symbols as explained in Subsection 2.1. We assume that ZF is formulated as an L-theory, with
the natural axioms for defining the arithmetic and syntactic symbols of L. L+ denotes any
expansion of L with a finite number of new symbols.
The Separation schema applying to all formulae of a language L is denoted Sep(L), and the
Replacement schema applying to all formulae of a language L is denoted Rep(L).
The official meta-theory is ZF, but the authors expect the results to hold in considerably
weaker systems. Suppose that in the meta-theory we consider a definable set A = {x | φ(x)},
such as a theory. We may then refer to the corresponding set within an object-theory, for
example as follows: Using the symbol A somewhat ambiguously, we write a statement of the form
ZF ⊢ · · ·M |= A · · · for the more formally precise statement of the form ZF ⊢ · · · ∃X
(
∀x(x ∈
X ↔ φ(x)) ∧ ∀x ∈ X (M |= x)
)
· · · . To illustrate, we might express a special case of Gdel’s
completeness within T as T ⊢
(
ConZF ↔ ∃M(M |= ZF)
)
.
As default, we work with first-order languages and classical logic, but we will consider addi-
tional deductive rules (NEC and CONEC). If S and T are systems in languages both including L,
then S ≡L T is the statement that S and T have the same L-theorems. If S is a system involving
deductive rules, and A is an axiom, then S+A denotes the natural extension of S in which these
deductive rules may be applied to proofs also involving A. For example, in MS + ∃xM(x), we
may use NEC to derive ∀U ∈ MMod(U , p∃xM(x)q).
V is the class of all sets.
Var is the set of variables {x, x0, x1, . . . , y, y0, y1, . . . , z, z0, z1, . . . }, indexed by the natural
numbers. But we freely use other symbols (such as p, f,U , · · · ) for variables as well. VA is the
class of variable-assignments, {f | f : Var→ V }. If a is a set (or a structure), then VAa is the set
{f | f : Var→ a} of all variable-assignments to elements of (the domain of) a. If f is a variable-
assignment and v is a variable, then VAf,v is the set of all variable-assignments g, such that
g(v) = f(v). Suppose that we are working in a set theory T in a language L containing a term
t. Note that for n < ω, T proves from v1 ∈ Var, · · · , vn ∈ Var that there is a primitive recursive
variable-assignment f satisfying f(v1) = t1, · · · , f(vn) = tn. Such a variable assignment f is
denoted 〈v1, . . . vn〉 7→ 〈t1, · · · tn〉 (or just v1 7→ t1 in the case n = 1).
We assume that model theory is set up so that any structure M uniquely determines its
language, which we denote by L(M), and we take the symbol “M” to refer ambiguously to both
the structure and its domain. Let M be an L-structure, φ a formula in L and f ∈ VAM. We
use the arrow-notation ~a for finite tuples 〈a1, · · · , an〈, and the shorthand ~a ∈ M for that each
component ai of ~a is an element of M. We write M |= (φ, f) for the statement “φ is true in
M under the variable-assignment f”, as defined in the usual Tarskian semantics of first-order
logic. if ~a ∈ M and ψ(~x) ∈ L, then we write M |= ψ(~a) for M |= (ψ, ~x 7→ ~a). We write M |= φ
for ∀f ∈ VAMM |= (φ, f). If K is a sublanguage of L, then M↾K denotes the reduct of M to
K. We write M≡K N for the statement that M satisfy the same K-sentences as N . We write
M∼=K N for the statement thatM↾K is isomorphic to N↾K . When the subscripts are dropped,
they are assumed to be L(M).
We use abbreviations for certain variations of the quantifiers:
1. ∃x ∈ y φ stands for ∃x (x ∈ y ∧ φ) .
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2. ∀x ∈ y φ stands for ∀x (x ∈ y → φ).
3. ∃!x φ stands for ∃x (φ(x) ∧ ∀y (φ(y)→ x = y)).
4. µx φ stands for ∃x ∈ N
(
φ(x) ∧ ∀y ∈ N (φ(y)→ x ≤ y)
)
.
If P is a predicate symbol, we may write x ∈ P for P (x). Similarly, we write ∃x ∈ P φ for
∃x.(P (x)→ φ) , and so on.
We will introduce primitive relation symbols for satisfaction, ‘Sat’, and for handling satisfac-
tion in a universe, ‘Mod’ and ‘M’. LSat denotes the language L augmented with the symbol Sat,
while LMod denotes L augmented with Mod and M.
Again, we introduce some abbreviations:
1. Tr(φ) and Tr(φ) stands for ∀f ∈ VA Sat(φ, f).
2. Mod(U , φ) stands for ∀f ∈ VAU Mod(U , φ, f).
3. Tr(φ) stands for ∀U ∈ M ∀f ∈ VAU Mod(U , φ, f).
4. Tr3(φ) stands for ¬Tr(¬˙φ).
If X is a formula, term or definable object in the language L of the structure M, then XM
denotes its interpretation in M; e.g. φM =df {~a ∈ M | M |= φ(~x)}. If M is a model of set
theory and a ∈ M, then aM =df {x ∈M | x ∈M a}.
2.3 Recursive saturation
A type p(~x), over a theory T in a language L, is a set of L-formulae such that T ∪ p is consistent
when the variables ~x are considered as fresh constant symbols. If M |= T , then p(~x) is realized
in M if there is ~a ∈ M, such that for all φ(~x) ∈ p, we have M |= φ(~a). A type p(~x,~b), over M
with parameters ~b ∈ M, is a type over Th(M,~b) (the theory of M with parameters ~b). Such a
type p(~x,~b) is recursive if it is a recursive set (under some fixed Go¨del coding of the formulae as
natural numbers). A structure M is recursively saturated if it realizes every recursive type over
M. A crsm is a countable recursively saturated model.
Theorem 2.1 (Completeness of the crsm-semantics). LetM be a countable model in a recursive
language. There is a countable recursively saturated elementary extension of M. In particular,
every consistent theory in a recursive language is modeled by a crsm.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 2.4.1 in [Chang & Keisler, 1990].
Let M be a model of a set theory T . The interpretations of the numerals in M are called
the standard natural numbers of M. For each n < ω, let us make the identification n = nM. We
say that M is ω-non-standard if there is c ∈ (ωM)M \ ω. Such a c is said to be a non-standard
number of M. Suppose that M is ω-non-standard. We say that a subset A of ω is coded in M,
if there is a ∈M, such that aM ∩ ω = A. We define the standard system of M as
SSy(M) =df {A ⊆ ω | “A is coded in M”}.
The following result is due to Wilmers [Wilmers, 1975], employing a very influential back-
and-forth technique invented by Friedman [Friedman, 1973].
Theorem 2.2 (Canonicity of countable recursively saturated models). Let M and N be crsm:s
of a set theory T in language L. If M≡ N and SSy(M) = SSy(N ), then M∼= N .
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Proof. See the proof of Theorem 7.14 in [Gorbow, 2019].
We define:
crsm =df {M |= ZF | “M is a crsm” ∧ ∀N (N ∼=M→ rank(M) ≤ rank(N )}.
2.4 Systems of satisfaction over ZF
Before embarking on developing a framework for a semantic notion of truth-in-a-universe relevant
to the set-theoretic multiverse, we shall go through some related systems of truth over ZF. An
intuitive philosophical perspective is that systems of truth capture various absolute notions of
truth, as motivated by the universe view of set theory, while our framework for truth-in-a-universe
captures various relative notions of truth, as motivated by the multiverse view of set-theory. From
a mathematical perspective, it is interesting to relate these two approaches. Moreover, since we
will generalize techniques that have been developed for studying systems of truth, these provide
a relevant context for viewing our results.
Right at the start of the endeavour to axiomatize truth, one faces the choice between intro-
ducing (to the base language of set theory) a unary truth-predicate Tr(σ), applying to sentences
σ, or a binary satisfaction-relation Sat(φ, f), applying to formulae φ and variable-assignments
f : Var → V . In the former option, σ needs to range over a class-sized language where there is
a constant-symbol cx corresponding to each x ∈ V . The authors have chosen the latter option.
As a general heuristic, one is justified to expect any theory of satisfaction to be interpretable
in a corresponding theory of truth; the idea being to interpret Sat(φ(x), f) by Tr(φ[cf(x)/x]).
Fujimoto has made a comprehensive study of theories of truth over set theory, following the
former option [Fujimoto, 2012].
System 2.3 (CT). Let S be a set-theory in L+. The system CT(S)↾ (for Compositional Truth)
consists of these axioms in the language L+Sat:
S
CT= ∀y0, y1
(
Sat(px0 = x1q, 〈px0q, px1q〉 7→ 〈y0, y1〉)↔ y0 = y1
)
CT∈ ∀y0, y1
(
Sat(px0 ∈ x1q, 〈px0q, px1q〉 7→ 〈y0, y1〉)↔ y0 ∈ y1
)
CT¬ ∀φ ∈ L
+
Sat ∀f ∈ VA (Sat(¬. φ, f)↔ ¬Sat(φ, f))
CT∧ ∀φ, ψ ∈ L
+
Sat ∀f ∈ VA (Sat(φ ∧. ψ, f)↔ Sat(φ, f) ∧ Sat(ψ, f))
CT∀ ∀φ ∈ L
+
Sat ∀f ∈ VA (Sat(∀.u φ, f)↔ ∀g ∈ VAf,u Sat(φ, g))
We write CT↾ for CT(ZF)↾. The axioms of the form CT− are called compositional axioms. By
basic logic, CT ↾ also proves the axioms CT∨, CT
→ and CT∃ (analogously defined). We use
phrases such as “Sat is ∨-compositional” to express that we have CT∨, for example.
CT is CT↾ +Sep(LSat) + Rep(LSat).
A routine induction argument in the meta-theory shows that CT↾ proves the schema Tr(pσq)↔
σ, for all L-setences σ. The theory of satisfaction CT↾ + Sep(LSat) corresponds to the theory of
truth TC↾ + Sep+ in [Fujimoto, 2012, §4]. It is straightforward to interpret the former in the
latter. Using this, it follows from Theorem 20 in [Fujimoto, 2012, §4.1] that CT↾ + Sep(LSat)
is conservative over ZF. In contrast, in CT we have access to the Reflection theorem for LSat-
formulae, enabling us to prove that there is a Vα modelling ZF. See [Fujimoto, 2012, §4.1] for
more details and refinements.
System 2.4 (GRω). Let S be a set-theory in L+. Here we present the systems of iterated Global
Reflection over S, denoted GRα(S), for ordinals α ≤ ω. For any set theory T in the language
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LSat, the axiom of Global Reflection over T is
GRT ∀φ ∈ L
+
Sat (PrT (φ)→ Tr(φ)).
Recursively, for each α ≤ ω, we define the system GRα(S):
GR0(S) =df CT(S)↾ + Sep(L
+
Sat)
GRα+1(S) =df GR
α(S) + GRGRα
GRω(S) =df
⋃
n<ω
GRn(S)
We write GRα for GRα(ZF).
Remark. Observe that GRα is defined with CT ↾ + Sep(LSat) as base case, thus without
Replacement for formulae with the Satisfaction predicate. The reason for this is that it is
intended to express iterated Global Reflection over ZF, which CT↾ + Sep(LSat) conservatively
extends. If it were defined with CT as base case, then it would not be morally “over ZF”, since
CT proves strong reflection principles of its own.
System 2.5 (FS). The systems FS↾ and FS (for Friedman-Sheard) are obtained by adding these
rules of proof to CT↾ and CT, respectively:
NEC For each φ ∈ LSat: If FS ⊢ φ, then FS ⊢ Sat(pφq).
CONEC For each φ ∈ LSat: If FS ⊢ Sat(pφq), then FS ⊢ φ.
Given a set-theoretic system S in language L, this rule will be considered:
Reflection rule For each φ in L: If S ⊢ PrS(pφq), then S ⊢ φ.
Proposition 2.6. If there is an ω-model of ZF, then ZF admits the Reflection rule.
Proof. Let M be an ω-model of ZF. Suppose ZF ⊢ PrZF(pφq). Since M is an ω-model, the
witness of M |= PrZF(pφq) is a standard proof, whence ZF ⊢ φ.
Definition 2.7. A set-theoretic system S in language L is ω-inconsistent if there is an L-formula
♁(x) such that:
S ⊢ ∃x ♁(x)
For each n ∈ N, S ⊢ ¬♁(n)
We say that ♁(x) witnesses the ω-inconsistency of S.
Let c be a fresh constant symbol. Note that the schema {m < c < ω | m ∈ N}, expressing that
there is a non-standard natural number, yields ω-inconsistency when added to a set-theoretic
system (proof: take x = c as ♁). Conversely, if S is an ω-inconsistent system, then S interprets
{m < c < ω | m ∈ N}. To show this, observe that in S we can define d < ω to be the least
number such that ♁(d); the result easily follows from interpreting c by d.
Proposition 2.8. GRω is ω-inconsistent and GRω + GRGRω is inconsistent.
Proof. This is a corollary of McGee’s Theorem, and can be proved analogously as Theorem 13.9
and Corollary 14.39 in [Halbach, 2014].
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So if we were to naturally extend the definition of GRα to all ordinals α, then we would get
that GRα is inconsistent for all α > ω.
Later on we will introduce a multiverse axiom, called Self-Representation, to the effect that
the universe of the background theory is isomorphic (over L) to one of its internal universes; this
axiom is motivated by the idea that the universe of the background theory should be represented
in its multiverse. The following Lemma establishes a technical result needed to validate that
axiom.
Lemma 2.9. Let k < α ≤ ω, and let U |= GRα. Then there is V ∈ U , such that U satisfies
V ∈ crsm ∧ V |= truth,
where truth =df {σ ∈ Sent(LSat) | Tr(σ)}; in particular, U satisfies that V |= GR
k. Moreover, if
U ∈ crsm, then U ∼=L VU .
Proof. We work in U . From ZF + Sep(LSat) we get that the set Tr = {φ ∈ Sent(LSat) | Tr(φ)}
exists. For the first statement, by completeness of the crsm-semantics, it suffices to establish
Con(Tr); and for this it suffices to establish Con(σ), where σ is an arbitrary finite conjunction
of sentences in Tr. By ∧-compositionality of Sat, we have Sat(σ). By GRZF+Sep(LSat), we have
PrZF+Sep(LSat)(¬. σ) → Sat(¬. σ), and by ¬-compositionality of Sat, we have Sat(¬. σ) ↔ ¬Sat(σ).
So since Sat(σ), we obtain PrZF+Sep(LSat)(¬. σ)→ ⊥, whence Con(σ). By Theorem 2.1, we can let
V be a model of Tr in crsm.
It follows from GRGRk that GR
k ⊆ Tr, yielding the second statement.
We proceed to establish U ∼=L VU by invoking Theorem 2.2, working now in the meta-theory.
Thus we need to show that SSy(U) = SSy(VU ) and U ≡L VU .
Note that there is an embedding i mapping ω properly and initially into (ωU )U (since U is ω-
non-standard), which in turn is mapped properly and initially into (ω(VU))(VU ) by an embedding
j (since U satisfies that V is ω-non-standard). Therefore, we obtain SSy(U) = SSy(VU ) as follows:
Since i is proper and initial, any subset of ω coded in U has a code in (ωU)U , which is mapped
to a corresponding code in (ω(VU))(VU ) by j. Conversely, since j is proper and initial, any subset
of ω coded in VU has a code in (ω(VU ))(VU), and therefore it also has a code in (ω
U )U (since i is
proper and initial).
To see U ≡L VU , let φ be a sentence of L. By absoluteness of |= for standard formulae,
VU |= φ⇔ U |= (V |= (pφq)).
Since Sat satisfies the Tarski-biconditionals for L, we have
U |= φ⇔ U |= Tr(pφq).
Combining these with the first statement of this lemma, we obtain U ≡L VU , as desired.
Axioms 2.10. Let ι be a function symbol and self be a constant symbol. Let L+ι be L
+
augmented with ι, let L+self be L
+ augmented with self, and let L+ι,self be L
+ augmented with ι
and self (they may already contain them). Iso(x) denotes an L+ι -formula expressing that x is an
L+-structure and that ι is an ∈-isomorphism from the universe V onto x. We shall study this
axiom in L+ι,self :
Iso(self)
(This formulation is chosen over ∃x Iso(x), as it is convenient to have a reference to a witness.)
By the ∈-isomorphism property, and the absoluteness of |= for standard formulae, we have:
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Proposition 2.11. For each φ(~x) ∈ L, ZF+ Iso(self) ⊢ (self |= pφ(ι(~x))q)↔ φ(~x).
System 2.12. Let S be a set-theoretic system. By recursion, for each α ≤ ω, we define the
system SRα(S) (standing for Self-Representation):
SR0(S) =df GR
0(S) = CT(S)↾ + Sep(LSat)
SRα+1(S) =df GR
α+1(S) + self↾L∈ crsm + Iso(self) + self |= truth ∪ SR
α(S)
SRω(S) =df
⋃
n<ω
SRn(S),
where truth =df {σ ∈ Sent(LSat) | Tr(σ)}. We write SR
α for SRα(ZF).
Remark. A clarificatory note on the role of the languages in SRα. Let α ≥ 1. The langage
of SRα is L augmented with the symbols Sat, ι and self. SRα proves Separation for L augmented
with Sat and self, and it proves Replacement for L augmented with self (since self can be treated
as a parameter in these schemata).
Corollary 2.13. Let α ≤ ω. Every crsm U of GRα expands to a model of SRα. Moreover, if U
is a definable model, then the expansion is also definable.
Proof. We start by showing the case α < ω by induction. The base case α = 0 is trivial. The
induction hypothesis is that if U |= GRα, then U expands to a model of SRα; and if U is definable,
then the expansion is definable. Let U |= GRα+1. Applying Lemma 2.9, we find a crsm V in U ,
such that U ∼=L VU and U satisfies that V |= GR
α. So by the induction hypothesis applied in U ,
U satisfies that V expands to a model W of SRα. Thus, we can expand U to a model of SRα+1
by interpreting self by W and interpreting ι by an isomorphism witnessing U ∼=L VU .
Now to the case that α = ω: Assume that U |= GRω. By the above, {x |= Tr ∪ SRn | n < ω}
is a recursive type over U . So since U is recursively saturated, it is realized by some W in U . It
now follows from the end of the proof of Lemma 2.9 that U ∼=L WU , so that U can be expanded
to a model of SRω.
Assume now that U is definable. W can then be defined as the least element of a definable
enumeration of U that satisfies the appropriate conditions. An isomorphism witnessing U ∼=L VU
can also be defined: As seen from a close look at the proof of Theorem 2.2, the isomorphism is
constructed by recursion on enumerations of U and VU , both of which can be chosen definable
since U and VU are definable and countable.
3 Revision-semantical truth-in-a-universe
We shall now go through the key revision-semantical technique introduced in this paper, which
may be used to construct a variety of untyped truth-in-a-universe relations for the multiverse of
set theory. Revision-semantics was independently invented in [Gupta, 1982], [Herzberger, 1982a]
and [Herzberger, 1982b]. In [Friedman & Sheard, 1987], the axiomatic theory of truth FS was
presented and shown to be validated by a model constructed through such a revision-process.
The revision process starts with an arbitrary extension S0 of truth, and recursively defines Sn+1
as the theory of the structure (N, Sn). In particular, the theory of N is a subset of S1, and the
liar sentence is in Sn iff it is not in Sn+1.
The construction in this paper is somewhat different in that it is intentional. We start with a
more-or-less arbitrary formula defining truth-in-a-universe, and revise the definition in a revision-
semantical fashion. The construction can be modified by adjusting parameters. For example,
we shall see that certain conditions on the parameters result in that the eventual definition of
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truth-in-a-universe validates the semantical multiverse theoryMS, introduced in 4.5. This theory
is analogous to FS. In order to constrain the construction to the multiverse of ZF and for it to
make sense semantically, the parameters need to satisfy some basic conditions as specified in this
definition:
Definition 3.1. Let Tn(φ), Mn(U) and Mod0(U , φ, f) be formulae of the meta-language (L), in
the free variables {n, φ}, {n,U} and {U , φ, f}, respectively.4 For each n ∈ N:
Tn =df {φ | Tn(φ)}
Tω =df
⋃
n<ω
Tn
Mn =df {U | Mn(U)}
Mω =df
⋂
n<ω
Mn
(Tn)n∈N is intended to be a sequence of first-order set theories, and (Mn)n∈N is intended to be
a sequence of classes of models, as formally specified below. We say that T,M,Mod0 are revision
parameters if the following conditions are provable (closed under ∀n ∈ N, where appropriate):
1. “Tn is a set theory”
2. T0 ⊢ ZF+ Sep(L+) + Rep(L+)
3. Tn+1 ⊢ Tn
4. Mn+1(U)→ “U is a structure in the language of Tn”
5. M1(U)→ U |= ZF+ Sep(L+) + Rep(L+)
6. Mn+1 ⊆Mn
7. Mod0(U , φ, f)→ U ∈M0 ∧ φ ∈ L
+
Mod ∧ f ∈ VA
U
Note that the language of Tn must include L+, but may exceed it. In the construction below,
we shall see how an untyped revision-semantical truth-in-a-universe predicateModn, where n ∈ N
is the stage in the revision process, can be defined given revision parameters. Actually, only the
Mn andMod0 parameters influence the construction. The Tn parameter comes into play later on,
in the Main Lemma (in §4), where we show (under certain conditions on the revision parameters)
that the Modn predicate satisfies desirable semantical axioms when constructed in the theory
Tn.
The construction may intuitively be thought of as a recursive procedure, where Mod0 is a
more-or-less arbitrary truth-in-a-universe relation and each Modn+1 revises Modn into a more
adequate relation. It turns out to be efficient to perform the construction using Gdel’s fixed-
point lemma. It is in fact possible to choose Mod0 such that it gets revised to itself (see the
definition of Mod below). This phenomenon contrasts with the revision-semantics ordinarily
used to construct a model of the Friedman-Sheard theory of truth, where the revision-operation
has no fixed-point (see Theorem 14.11 in [Halbach, 2014]). A key difference between the present
revision-process and that one is that the former is intensional and the latter is extensional. In the
present framework we start with an arbitrary formula defining truth-in-a-universe and revise it to
more adequate definitions, while in the other framework one starts with an arbitrary extension
4Even though the n is notationally in subscript-position, it is a free variable of the formulae T and M. This
pattern will also be used for the formula Mod introduced below.
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of truth and revise it more adequate extensions. The move from extenstional to intensional
revision-semantics was the key conceptual insight needed to realize the present framework.
Construction 3.2 (Construction of Revision-semantics for the Multiverse). Let L+Mod be the
language obtained by augmenting L+ with a fresh ternary relation symbol Mod and a fresh
predicate M. We shall perform a recursive construction of formulae in L. Let Tn(φ), Mn(U) and
Mod0(U , φ, f) be revision parameters.
By Go¨del’s fixed-point lemma, there is a formulaModn(U , φ, f), in the free variables n,U , φ, f ,
such that provably:
Modn(U , φ, f)↔


n ∈ N ∧ “U is an L+-structure” ∧ φ ∈ L+Mod ∧ f ∈ VA
U
∧
(
n = 0→ Mod0(U , φ, f)
)
∧
(
n > 0→ 〈U , pModn−1q
U , pMn−1q
U〉 |= (φ, f)
)


Formally, we now have two references for the expression “Mod0”, the formula Mod0 and the
formulaModn, with the variable assignment n 7→ 0. However, it is clear that these are equivalent.
We will also have use of a shifted version of this formulaMod. Thus we use Go¨del’s fixed-point
lemma to define Modkn(U , φ, f), in the free variables k, n,U , φ, f , such that provably:
Modkn(U , φ, f)↔


k ∈ N ∧ n ∈ N ∧ “U is an L+-structure” ∧ φ ∈ L+Mod ∧ f ∈ VA
U
∧
(
n = 0→ Modk(U , ψ, f)
)
∧
(
n > 0→ 〈U , pMod
k
n−1q
U , pMn−1q
U 〉 |= (φ, f)
)


The above construction works for a very wide range of choices for Mod0. But by the fixed-
point lemma, we can chooseMod0 to be “equivalent to its own revision”, so that Modn and Mod
k
n
turn out to be constant with respect to n and k. Indeed, there is a formula Mod, such that
provably:
Mod(U , φ, f)↔
(
“U is an L+-structure” ∧ φ ∈ L+Mod ∧ f ∈ VA
U
∧〈U , pModqU , pMqU〉 |= (φ, f)
)
Note that if Mod0 is chosen to be Mod
, then we can prove by induction that for all k, n ∈ N:
Mod(U , φ, f)⇔ Modn(U , φ, f)⇔ Mod
k
n(U , φ, f)
We therefore make the natural simplifying convention that when Mod0 is explicitly chosen to be
Mod, then Modn and Mod
k
n are implicitly chosen to literally be Mod
 as well.
End of Construction.
Remark. A clarificatory note on the role of the languages in the construction above: Modn,
Modkn and Mod
 are L-formulae. L+ is the language to which these “Mod-formulae” apply; the
language under revision, so to speak. The Tn may have additional resources in their languages,
but they are only guaranteed to prove ZF+ Sep(L+) + Rep(L+).
For the reader familiar with the extensional revision-procedure used to construct a model
of FS, note how the recursive call in the fixed-point formula makes use of that it operates on
an intension, whose extension depends on the structure. In contrast the recursive call of the
revision-procedure for constructing a model of FS operates on an extension. The authors take
this to explain why it is possible to define a truth-in-a-universe relation Mod which is fixed
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Revision rules
NEC∗ ∀n ∈ N ∀φ ∈ L+
(
(Tn ⊢ φ)→ (Tn+1 ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= pφq))
)
CONEC∗ ∀n ∈ N ∀φ ∈ L+
(
(Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn (U |= pφq))→ Tn ⊢ φ
)
Reflection rule∗ ∀n ∈ N ∀φ ∈ L+
(
(Tn ⊢ PrTn(pφq))→ Tn ⊢ φ
)
Revision conditions
Soundness∗ ∀n ∈ N ∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= Tn)
Completeness∗ ∀n ∈ N ∀φ ∈ L+
(
(∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= φ))→ Tn ⊢ φ
)
Figure 3.1: Rules and conditions for the revision parameters
by the revision-procedure. By Theorem 14.11 in [Halbach, 2014], this is not possible in the
extensional revision-semantics.
Some conditions and rules for revision parameters, relevant for showing that the Modn pred-
icate constructed as above satisfies a desirable semantical theory (see the Main Lemma in §4),
are shown in Figure 3.1. If one of the rules holds, we say that the revision parameters admit
it. Essentially, if the revision parameters admit NEC∗ or CONEC∗, then the model of multiverse
semantics constructed admits NEC or CONEC, respectively. In practice it is often easier to work
with the other rule and conditions in Figure 3.1, using this Lemma:
Lemma 3.3. Let T,M,Mod0 be revision parameters.
(a) If Soundness∗ is provable, then the parameters admit NEC∗.
(b) If Completeness∗ is provable and the parameters admit the Reflection rule∗, then the parame-
ters admit CONEC∗.
Proof. (a) Let n ∈ N and φ ∈ L+. Assume that Soundness∗ is provable and that Tn ⊢ φ.
By the former, and Tn+1 ⊢ ZF, we have Tn+1 ⊢ Soundness
∗. By the latter, we have
Tn+1 ⊢ PrTn(pφq). Combining these, we get Tn+1 ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= pφq)) as desired.
(b) Let n ∈ N and φ ∈ L+. Assume that Completeness∗ is provable and the parameters admit
the Reflection rule∗. Moreover, suppose that Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn (U |= pφq). Since Tn ⊢ ZF, we
have Tn ⊢ Completeness
∗ ∧Mn+1 ⊆ Mn. Now suppose that Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈ Mn (U |= pφq).
Then Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= pφq), and Tn ⊢ PrTn(pφq). So by the Reflection rule
∗, Tn ⊢ φ,
as desired.
4 The theory of multiverse semantics and its model con-
struction
Section 3 showed how a revision-semantical relation of truth-in-a-universe can be constructed in
set theory. We turn now to the task of finding appropriate axioms for truth-in-a-universe that
are validated by such revision-constructions.
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System 4.1 (CM). CM, standing for Compositional Multiverse semantics, is axiomatized as
follows:
Base ZF+ Sep(LMod) + Rep(LMod)
MultiverseZF Tr

(
ZF+ Sep(LMod) + Rep(LMod)
)
CM= ∀U ∈M ∀f ∈ VA
U
(
Mod(U , px = yq, f)↔ f(x) = f(y))
)
CM¬ ∀U ∈M ∀φ ∈ LMod ∀f ∈ VA
U
(
Mod(U ,¬. φ, f)↔ ¬Mod(U , φ, f)
)
CM∧ ∀U ∈M ∀φ, ψ ∈ LMod ∀f ∈ VA
U
(
Mod(U , φ∧.ψ, f)↔ (Mod(U , φ, f) ∧Mod(U , ψ, f))
)
CM∀ ∀U ∈M ∀φ ∈ LMod ∀f ∈ VA
U
(
Mod(U , ∀.u φ, f)↔ ∀g ∈ VA
U
f,u Mod(U , φ, g)
)
If L′ expands L, then we write CM(L′) for the system obtained by replacing all occurrences
of LMod above by the language L′Mod obtained by augmenting L
′ with the symbols M and Mod.
Remark. The natural analogue axioms CM∨,CM→,CM∃ are easily derived in CM.
Remark. In CM, each U ∈ M may be viewed as an LMod-structure, by performing this
assignment:
∈U =df
{
〈a, b〉 | Mod(U , px ∈ yq, 〈x, y〉 7→ 〈a, b〉)
}
MU =df
{
a | Mod(U , pM(x)q, x 7→ a)
}
ModU =df
{
〈a, b, c〉 | Mod(U , pMod(x, y, z)q, 〈x, y, z〉 7→ 〈a, b, c〉)
}
Accordingly, we will occasionally use the notation U |= φ for satisfaction in that LMod-structure.
Using the compositional axioms of CM, it is easily shown that Mod(U , φ, f)⇔ U |= (φ, f).
In applications, it is natural to add further axioms to CM, ensuring e.g. that we can prove:
Non-Triviality M 6= ∅
Note that over CM, Non-Triviality is equivalent to Tr(p⊥q) → ⊥. Recall that the formulae
Tr(σ) and Tr3(σ) are defined as ∀U ∈ M (Mod(U , σ)) and ¬Tr(¬. σ), respectively. We may
naturally consider the interpretation of the modal operators ,3, generated by interpreting σ
by Tr(pσq). Therefore, it is useful to exhibit some compositional conditions easily provable for
Tr in CM and CM+ Non-trivility:
Proposition 4.2. CM proves:
CM→ ∀φ, ψ ∈ Sent(LMod)
(
Tr(φ→. ψ)→ (Tr
(φ)→ Tr(ψ))
)
CM↔ ∀φ, ψ ∈ Sent(LMod)
(
Tr(φ↔. ψ)→ (Tr
(φ)↔ Tr(ψ))
)
CM∧ ∀φ, ψ ∈ Sent(LMod)
(
Tr(φ∧. ψ)↔ (Tr
(φ) ∧ Tr(ψ))
)
Proposition 4.3. CM+ Non-Triviality proves:
CM⊥ Tr
(p⊥q)↔ ⊥
CM
3
∀φ ∈ Sent(LMod)
(
Tr3(φ)↔ ∃U ∈MMod(U , φ)
)
CM¬ ∀φ ∈ Sent(LMod)
(
Tr(¬. φ)→ ¬Tr
(φ)
)
Lemma 4.4 (Soundness Lemma). CM proves that for all U ∈ M, {σ ∈ LMod | Mod(U , σ)} is
deductively closed.
Proof. Using the compositional axioms CM¬, CM∧ and CM∀, this is proved just like the soundness
theorem for the usual semantics of first-order logic.
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The theoryMS defined below is the muliverse-semantical counterpart of the Friedman-Sheard
theory of truth FS:
System 4.5 (MS). Consider these rules of proof:
NEC For each φ ∈ LMod: If MS ⊢ φ, then MS ⊢ Tr
(pφq).
CONEC For each φ ∈ LMod: If MS ⊢ Tr
(pφq), then MS ⊢ φ.
For each 1 ≤ n ∈ N, NECn is the rule sanctioning n− 1 applications of NEC, and CONECn is the
rule sanctioning n− 1 applications of CONEC, in a linear Hilbert-style proof system.
The system MS is CM + NEC + CONEC. For each n ∈ N, the system MSn is defined by
MS0 =df ZF+ Sep(LMod) + Rep(LMod), and for n > 0, MSn =df CM+ NECn + CONECn.
If L′ expands L, then we write MS(L′) for the system obtained by replacing all occurrences of
LMod in its axioms and rules by the language L′Mod obtained by augmenting L
′ with the symbols
M and Mod.
Recall that if S is a system involving deductive rules, and A is an axiom, then S+A denotes
the natural extension of S in which these deductive rules may be applied to proofs also involving
A. For example, in MS+ ∃xM(x) we may use NEC to derive ∀U ∈MMod(U , p∃xM(x)q).
The next theorem applied standard arguments from axiomatic theories of truth to exhibit
paradoxical multiverse-semantical statements.
Theorem 4.6. Each of the following axioms is inconsistent over CM+ NEC:
Untyped Multiverse Reflection schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(LMod), Tr
(pσq)→ σ
Untyped 4 schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(LMod), Tr
(pσq)→ Tr(pTr(pσq)q)
Proof. By Gdel diagonalization, there is an LMod-sentence λ, such that
CM ⊢ λ↔ ¬Tr(pλq).
By Untyped Multiverse Reflection, Tr(pλq)→ λ, so we get ¬Tr(pλq), and therefore λ. Now
Tr(pλq) follows by NEC, a contradiction.
By Untyped 4 schema, Tr(pλq) → Tr(pTr(pλq)q), so by CM↔, Tr
(pλq) → Tr(p¬λq),
and by CM¬ , Tr
(pλq) → ¬Tr(pλq). So we get ¬Tr(pλq) and therefore λ. Now Tr(pλq)
follows by NEC, a contradiction.
Let S be a set theory in a language L ⊇ L+ and let t be an L-term, such that S ⊢ t ∈ N.
Then It denotes the interpretation of the language LMod (which is L augmented with Mod and
M) into L generated by interpreting Mod by Modt and M by Mt. Note that this interpretation
fixes each formula in L. We say that It satisfies an L
+
Mod-formula φ (in S), if S ⊢ It(φ), and
that It satisfies an L
+
Mod-system Q (in S), written S ⊢ It(Q), if it satisfies every consequence
of Q. Note that It depends on S, L, t, T, M and Mod0. In the few cases that these need to
be specified, the full notation is IT,M,Mod0S,L,t . Dependencies that are clear from the context will be
suppressed from the notation.
More generally, if S ⊢ ∃!x (φ(x) ∧ x ∈ N), then Iφ denotes the interpretation generated by
interpreting Mod by ∀x ∈ N (φ(x) → Modx) and M by ∀x ∈ N (φ(x) → Mx). We may expand
the language with a constant symbol cφ and extend S with the axiom ∀x (φ(x) ↔ x = cφ), to
produce an interpretation Icφ equivalent to Iφ. For notational convenience, the Lemma below
is stated in terms of an interpretation of the form It, but by the above remark it holds more
generally for an interpretation of the form Iφ.
We are now ready to embark on proving the main lemma of the paper. This result encapsu-
lates the revision-semantical model construction of the theory of multiverse semantics.
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Main Lemma. Let T, M and Mod0 be revision parameters, and assume that the languages of
the Tn do not contain the symbols M and Mod. Let 1 ≤ n ∈ N and let t be a term such that
T0 ⊢ n ≤ t ∈ N. If the revision parameters admit NEC
∗, CONEC∗ or both, then for each m < n,
It satisfies CM+NECn−m+Tm+1, CM+CONECn−m+Tm+1 or MSn−m+Tm+1, respectively,
in Tn.
Proof. We prove the latter, most complicated assertion; the other two assertions follow by re-
stricting the proof to the appropriate cases. Let σ ∈ Sent(L+Mod). Assume that T,M,Mod0 are re-
vision parameters admitting NEC∗ and CONEC∗. Observe that for eachm < n, the shifted param-
eters T′(k, φ) =df T(k+m,φ),M
′(k,U) =df M(k+m,U) andMod
′
0(U , φ, f) =df Modm(U , φ, f) are
revision parameters admitting NEC∗ and CONEC∗. Therefore, it suffices to show that Tn ⊢ It(σ),
whenever MSn +T1 ⊢ σ.
Firstly, note that Tn ⊢ It(ZF+ Sep(L
+
Mod) + Rep(L
+
Mod)), since Mt and Modt are L-formulae
and since Tn ⊢ T0 ⊢ ZF + Sep(L+) + Rep(L+). Secondly, we show Tn ⊢ It(CM): Norm and
MultiverseZF follow from that T,M,Mod0 are appropriate parameters (provably in T0). The
compositional axioms of the form “CMx”, follow from that for all L+-structures U and all L+-
formulae φ,
Modt(U , φ) ⇐⇒ 〈U , pModt−1q
U , pMt−1q
U〉 |= φ,
and from that |= is compositional. Thirdly, since It is the identity on L+ and Tn ⊢ T1, it
satisfies T1. In particular, this establishes the case n = 1.
We proceed by induction. Assume that n ≥ 1, and that T,M,Mod0 are revision parameters
admitting NEC∗ and CONEC∗. Also assume the induction hypothesis that I~ps satisfies MSn+T1,
for any revision parameters ~p admitting NEC∗ and CONEC∗, and for any term s such that
T0 ⊢ n ≤ s ∈ N. Since t is sufficiently arbitrary, it suffices to show that It+1 satisfies MSn+1+T1
in Tn. There are five inductive cases as to which, if any, further applications of the rules NEC and
CONEC are made, and if both, in which order: no rule, pure NEC, pure CONEC, NEC-CONEC,
and CONEC-NEC.
In the no rule case, showing MSn+1 + T1 ⊢ φ ⇒ Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(φ), is a matter of showing
MSn + T1 ⊢ φ ⇒ Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(φ). Note that the shifted parameters T′(k, φ) =df T(k + 1, φ),
M′(k,U) =df M(k+1,U) and Mod
′
0(U , φ, f) =df Mod1(U , φ, f) are revision parameters admitting
NEC∗ and CONEC∗. Let I ′t be the interpretation in T
′
n = Tn+1 generated by interpreting Mod
by Mod′t and M by M
′
t. Naturally, It+1 = I
′
t. Now, by the induction hypothesis, we have
MSn +T1 ⊢ φ⇒ T
′
n ⊢ I
′
t(φ), so MSn +T1 ⊢ φ⇒ Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(φ), as desired.
We introduce four proof-pictures to keep track of the arguments for the remaining cases.
The pure NEC case:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ φ
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
The pure CONEC case:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ
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The NEC-CONEC case:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ φ
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
...
...
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ
The CONEC-NEC case:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ
...
...
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ φ
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
In all these four cases, we shall show how to fill in on the right side so as to establish the
appropriate Tn+1 ⊢ In+1(A) on the bottom line. The top line on each right side will follow from
the induction hypothesis.
We start by covering CONEC for the cases above. Let k ∈ N and note that T,M,Modn are
revision parameters admitting NEC∗ and CONEC∗; accordingly let Ikn be the interpretation in
Tn generated by interpreting M by Mn and Mod by Modn+k. The following is called argument
(†):
MSn +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
Tn ⊢ I
k
t
(
∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
)
Induction hypothesis
Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈MnModn+k(U , pψq) Definition of I
k
t
Tn ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn U |= pIt+k−1(ψ)q Definition of Modn+k
Tn ⊢ It+k−1(ψ) CONEC
∗
In the pure CONEC case, we use argument (†) with k = 2, and use Tn+1 ⊢ Tn, obtaining:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq) Tn ⊢ I
2
t (∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq))
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(ψ)
In the CONEC-NEC case, argument (†) is used with k = 1. Thereafter, we proceed with the
standard interpretation of classical logic to establish the right side version of the next to last
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line:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq) Tn ⊢ I
1
t (∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq))
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ Tn ⊢ It(ψ)
...
...
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ φ Tn ⊢ It(φ)
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
In the NEC-CONEC case, we assume for the moment that Tn+1 ⊢ I1t+1(∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq))
has been derived beforehand. Under this assumption, Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(ψ) is derived as in the
appropriate final segment of argument (†), with k = 1, but with n replaced by n+ 1:
...
...
MSn +T1 ⊢ φ
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
...
...
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq)
[
Tn+1 ⊢ I
1
t+1(∀U ∈MMod(U , pψq))
]
MSn+1 +T1 ⊢ ψ Tn+1 ⊢ It+1(ψ)
We proceed to verify the additional application of NEC, for the appropriate cases. Let k ∈ N.
In the pure NEC and NEC-CONEC cases, Tn ⊢ Ikt (φ) follows from the induction hypothesis,
while in the CONEC-NEC case it has been derived beforehand. In each case we need to obtain
Tn+1 ⊢ Ikt+1
(
∀U ∈ MMod(U , pφq)
)
from Tn ⊢ Ikt (φ), for an appropriate k ∈ N. We do so
arguing as follows:
Tn ⊢ I
k
t (φ)
Tn+1 ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn+1 (U |= pI
k
t (φ)q) NEC
∗
Tn+1 ⊢ ∀U ∈Mn+1 Mod
k
n+1(U , pφq) Definition of Mod
k
n+1
Tn+1 ⊢ I
k
t+1
(
∀U ∈MMod(U , pφq)
)
Definition of Ikt+1
This immediately completes the pure NEC and CONEC-NEC cases. For the NEC-CONEC case,
one only needs to make the additional observation that Tn+1 ⊢ In+1(∀U ∈ MMod(U , pψq))
may be derived from Tn+1 ⊢ In+1
(
∀U ∈ MMod(U , pφq)
)
through the standard interpretation
of classical logic.
Corollary 4.7. Let T,M,Mod0 be revision parameters such that T0 is ω-inconsistent as wit-
nessed by a formula ♁(x). If they admit NEC
∗, CONEC∗ or both, then Tω interprets CM+NEC+
Tω, CM+ CONEC+Tω or MS+Tω, respectively, through Iµx ♁(x).
Proof. We work in the meta-theory. Let 1 ≤ n ∈ N. Then ¬♁(n), so by the Main Lemma
applied with 2n − 1 for n and n − 1 for m, we have that Iµx ♁(x) satisfies CM + NECn + Tn,
CM + CONECn + Tn or MSn + Tn, respectively. Since n is sufficiently arbitrary, the result
follows.
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Reflexive axioms
Non-Triviality M 6= ∅
Multiverse Reflection schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(L) : Tr(pσq)→ σ
Self-Representation Iso(self) +M(self)
Modal axioms
K schema ∀σ, τ ∈ Sent(L) : Tr(pσ → τq)→
(
Tr(pσq)→ Tr(pτq)
)
T schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(L) : Tr(pσq)→ σ
4 schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(L) : Tr(pσq)→ Tr(pTr(pσq)q)
Lb’s schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(L) :
(
Tr(pTr(pσq)→ σq)→ Tr(pσq)
)
Figure 4.1: Semantically motivated multiverse axioms
Modal extentions of CM
KCM CM+ K schema+ NEC
TCM KCM +Multiverse Reflection schema
K4CM KCM + 4 schema
GLCM K4CM + Lb’s schema
S4CM K4CM +Multiverse Reflection schema
Figure 4.2: Modally motivated multiverse theories
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show further axioms and systems relevant to the multiverse perspective.
Note that the Multiverse Reflection schema is the same as the T schema. Only the former term
will be used, the latter is exhibited for the reader’s convenience when viewing the common
modal axioms. The Reflexive axioms may be viewed as statements, of increasing strength, that
the universe of the background theory is reflected in the multiverse: Non-Triviality just says that
there is a universe in the multiverse; Multiverse Reflection is equivalent to that any L-sentence
holding in the background universe also holds in some universe; and Self-Representation goes as
far as saying that the background universe is isomorphic to a universe in the multiverse.
The following Proposition relates the natural systems obtained by adding reflexive axioms to
CM+ NEC.
Proposition 4.8. Over CM+ NEC:
(a) ⊢ KCM
(b) Multiverse Reflection schema ⊢ TCM
(c) Multiverse Reflection schema ⊢ Non-Triviality
(d) Self-Representation ⊢ Multiverse Reflection schema
Proof. (a) This follows from Proposition 4.2.
(b) This is immediate from the previous item.
(c) From Tr(p⊥q)→ ⊥ we get ¬∀U ∈MMod(U , p⊥q), whence M 6= ∅.
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(d) Let σ ∈ L, and assume Tr(pσq). Then Mod(self, pσq). So by Proposition 2.11, we have σ.
The following Theorem establishes limitative results on modal extensions of CM+NEC. They
are analogous to results from [Halbach, Leitgeb & Welch, 2005].
Theorem 4.9. Over CM+ NEC:
(a) 4 schema ⊢ K4CM ⊢ GLCM
(b) Lb’s schema+ Non-Triviality ⊢ ⊥
(c) 4 schema+ Non-Triviality ⊢ ⊥
(d) S4CM ⊢ ⊥
(e) If Tr restricted to L is Σ01-definable, then ⊢ GL. More precisely, if φ(x) ∈ Σ
0
1, then {σ ∈
L | (φ(pσq)↔ Tr(pσq))} ⊢ GLCM
(f) If Tr is Σ01-definable, then ⊢ ⊥. More precisely, if φ(x) ∈ Σ
0
1, then {σ ∈ LMod | (φ(pσq)↔
Tr(pσq))} ⊢ ⊥
Proof. (a) The first ⊢ follows from a previous Proposition. The second ⊢ follows from Lb’s
theorem (see Lemma 13.7 in [Halbach, 2014]).
(b) Applying Lb’s schema to ⊥, we get Tr(pTr(p⊥q) → ⊥q) → Tr(p⊥q). Note that Non-
Triviality is equivalent to Tr(p⊥q) → ⊥. By NEC applied to that sentence, we have the
antecedent; but that sentence also gives us ⊥ from the consequent.
(c) This is immediate from the previous items.
(d) This is immediate from the previous item and the previous Proposition.
(e) We need to establish the 4 schema. Let φ(x) ∈ Σ01 and let σ ∈ Sent(L). Since φ is equiv-
alent to an arithmetic Σ1-formula, we have for any models M,N of PA, where N end-
extends M, that M |= φ(pσq) ⇒ N |= φ(pσq). Moreover, note that by NEC, we can prove
Tr
(
pφ(pσq)↔ Tr(pσq)q
)
. Let U ∈M, and let N = NU . We argue as follows:
Tr(pσq) Hypothesis
φ(pσq) φ(pσq)↔ Tr(pσq)
N |= pφ(pσq)q §2.1
NU |= pφ(pσq)q φ ∈ Σ
0
1 and NU end-extends N
U |= pN |= pφ(pσq)qq Standard formulae are |=-absolute
U |= pφ(pσq)q §2.1
Mod(U , pφ(pσq)q) φ ∈ L
Mod(U , pTr(pσq)q) Tr
(
pφ(pσq)↔ Tr(pσq)q
)
Tr(pTr(pσq)q) U arbitrary
(f) By the above argument, we obtain the Untyped 4 schema:
∀σ ∈ Sent(LMod), Tr
(pσq)→ Tr(pTr(pσq)q).
By Theorem 4.6, this is inconsistent with CM+ NEC.
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5 Upper bounds on multiverse-semantical theories
Theorem 5.1. ZF interprets GLCM. If ZF admits the Reflection rule, then this interpretation
also satisfies CONEC.
Proof. The idea is to interpret Mod(U , φ, f) and M(U) in such a way that M(U)⇔ (U |= ZF)⇔
Mod(U ,ZF), so that we can apply the completeness theorem to get Mod(U , φ)↔ PrZF(φ). Then
the result essentially follows from the well-known fact that the modal logic GL is validated by
the predicate PrZF, and that the relation |= satisfies the compositional axioms of CM. However,
there are some details involved that make it convenient to prove the result using the machienery
developed above.
Set L+ = L. Let T be a formula such that Tn = ZF, for each n ∈ N. Let M be a formula
such that Mn = {U | U |= ZF}, for each n ∈ N. Let Mod0 be Mod
. Recall that this choice
makes Modn constantly equal to Mod
, for all n ∈ N. Then it is easily verified that T,M,Mod
are revision parameters provably satisfying Soundness∗ and Completeness∗ (and admitting the
Reflection rule∗ in the case that ZF admits the Reflection rule). Hence, they admit NEC∗ (and
admit CONEC∗, in the case that ZF admits the reflection rule). Note that I0 = In, for all n ∈ N.
So by the Main Lemma, I0 satisfies CM + NECn (and MSn, in the case that ZF admits the
reflection rule), for each n ∈ N, whence I0 actually satisfies CM+NEC (and MS, in the case that
ZF admits the reflection rule).
By Theorem 4.9(e), it only remains to verify that I0(Tr
) is Σ01-definable in the appropriate
sense. Let φ(σ) be the Σ01-formula PrZF(σ). By the completeness theorem, ∀σ ∈ Sent(L) (φ(σ)↔
∀U ∈M0 (U |= σ)). So ∀σ ∈ Sent(L)
(
φ(σ)↔ I0(Tr
(σ))
)
, as desired.
Remark. By the above Theorem and Proposition 2.6, if there is an ω-model of ZF, then ZF
interprets GLCM + CONEC.
The following systems are useful for measuring the proof-theoretic strength of various exten-
sions of CM.
System 5.2. Let S be a set-theoretic system. We recursively define, for ordinals α, the theories
Conα(S) and Rα(S), of α-iterated consistency over S and α-iterated Reflection schema over S,
respectively:
Con0(S) =df S
Conα+1(S) =df Con
α(S) + ConConα(S)
Conα(S) =df
⋃
ξ<α
Conξ(S), for α a limit ordinal;
R0(S) =df S
Rα+1(S) =df R
α(S) + RRα(S)
Rα(S) =df
⋃
ξ<α
Rξ(S), for α a limit ordinal.
In the above, for any set theory T in language L, ConT is the formula ¬PrT (p⊥q), asserting the
consistency of T ; and RT is the so called Reflection schema:
{PrT (pφq)→ φ | φ ∈ L}.
We use the notations Conα and Rα for Conα(ZF) and Rα(ZF), respectively.
Corollary 5.3. Conω + {m < c < ω | m ∈ N} interprets CM + NEC+ Non-Triviality. Moreover,
Conω locally interprets CM+ NEC+ Non-Triviality.
23
Proof. We focus on the first statement. We can choose revision parameters T,M,Mod0, such
that for each n ∈ N:
Tn = Con
n + {m < c < ω | m ∈ N}
Mn+1 = {U | U |= Tn}
Clearly, these are revision parameters provably satisfying Soundness∗, and thereby admitting
NEC∗. Working in Tω = Con
ω + {m < c < ω | m ∈ N}, let d be the maximal natural number,
such that d ≤ c ∧ ConCond . Note that for each standard m ∈ N, we can prove m < d. So
by Corollary 4.7, Tω ⊢ Id(CM + NEC + Tω). Since Id fixes each formulae in the language of
Tω , it only remains to show that Tω ⊢ Id(Non-Triviality). Working in Tω, observe that by
the Completeness theorem, ConCond ⇒ Md+1 6= ∅ ⇒ Md 6= ∅ ⇔ Id(M 6= ∅), as desired.
The second statement is proved similarly, defining Tn = Con
n and using Ik for a large enough
k ∈ N.
Corollary 5.4. Rω(ZF+{m < c < ω | m ∈ N}) interprets MS+Multiverse Reflection. Moreover,
Rω locally interprets MS+Multiverse Reflection.
Proof. We focus on the first statement. We can choose revision parameters T,M,Mod0, such
that for each n ∈ N:
Tn = R
n(ZF+ {m < c < ω | m ∈ N})
Mn+1 = {U | U |= Tn}
It is easily seen that these are revision parameters provably satisfying Soundness∗, and thereby
admitting NEC∗. Similarly, it is easily seen that they admit the Reflection rule∗ and satisfy
Completeness∗, so that they admit CONEC∗. Let n ∈ N. By Corollary 4.7, Tω ⊢ Ic(MS +
Tω). Since Ic fixes each formula in the language of Tω , it only remains to verify that Tω ⊢
Id(Multiverse Reflection). Let σ ∈ L. We work in Tn, for arbitrary 1 ≤ n ∈ N: Suppose
Ic(Tr
(pσq)). Then ∀U ∈Mn (Modn(U , pσq)), so since σ ∈ L, we have ∀U ∈Mn (U |= pσq) by
definition of Modn. It now follows from the choice of Mn and the completeness theorem that
PrTn−1(pσq), so by RTn−1 , we deduce σ. Since σ = Ic(σ), we have Tω ⊢ Ic(Tr
(pσq)→ σ), as
desired. The second statement is proved similarly, defining Tn = R
n and using Ik for a large
enough k ∈ N.
Theorem 5.5. We have the following conservativity results for extensions of CM:
(a) GLCM ≡L ZF
(b) CM+ NEC+ Non-Triviality ≡L Con
ω
(c) MS+Multiverse Reflection schema ≡L Rω
Proof. Since M 6= ∅, we can use MultiverseZF and the Soundness Lemma (4.4) to prove ZF,
establishing the base cases of the induction arguments below.
(a) This is immediate from Theorem 5.1 and that the interpretation used in its proof restricts
to the identity on L.
(b) Suppose as induction hypothesis that we have proved Conn in CM+NEC+Non-Triviality. By
NEC, we have Tr(Conn. ). So by M 6= ∅ and Lemma 4.4, we can prove Con
n+Con(Con.
n) =
Conn+1, as desired.
The converse follows from Corollary 5.3 after observing that its interpretation restricts to
identity on L.
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(c) We shall show that for each n ∈ N, MS+Multiverse Reflection schema ⊢ Tr(R.
n). Then the
result follows from Multiverse Reflection. So suppose as induction hypothesis that
MS+Multiverse Reflection schema ⊢ Tr(R.
k).
Let σ ∈ L. We work in MS + Multiverse Reflection. Let U ∈ M. Note that by NEC,
Tr(pTr(R.
k)q), soMod(U , pTr(R.
k)q). Moreover, byMultiverseZF and NEC, we haveMod(U ,CM. ),
because NEC only needs to be applied to finitely many axioms.
Assume Mod(U , pPrR. k(pσq)q).We shall showMod(U , pσq). Since Mod(U ,CM. ), we can apply
the Soundness Lemma in U to obtain Mod(U , pTr(pσq)q). By applying NEC to the instance
Tr(pσq)→ σ ofMultiverse Reflection, we getMod(U , pTr(pσq)→ σq), so by the Soundness
Lemma, Mod(U , pσq), as desired.
The converse follows from Corollary 5.4 after observing that its interpretation restricts to
identity on L.
Theorem 5.6. GRω interprets MS(Lself) + Self-Representation.
Proof. Since GRω is ω-inconsistent, there is a formula ♁(x) such that GR
ω ⊢ ∃x < ω ♁(x), but
for each n ∈ N, GRω ⊢ ¬♁(n).
Set L+ to Lself . We proceed to work in GR
ω. Recall the definition of SR in System 2.12. We
can choose revision parameters T,M,Mod0, such that for each n ∈ N:
Tn = SR
n
Mn+1 = {U | U |= Tn ∧ U↾L∈ crsm}
It is easily seen that these are revision parameters satisfying Soundness∗, thus admitting NEC∗.
To see that they admit CONEC∗, we show that they satisfy Completeness∗ and admit the
Reflection rule∗: Completeness∗ is clear from the definition of M and Theorem 2.1 (the com-
pleteness theorem for crsm). For the Reflection rule∗, let φ ∈ Lι,self and assume that Tn+1 ⊢
PrTn(pφq). By Corollary 2.13, Tk is provably conservative over GR
k, for all k < ω. Applying
this conservativity twice (internally and externally) we get GRn+1 ⊢ PrGRn(pφq). Now it follows
from Global Reflection that GRn+1 ⊢ φ, whence Tn+1 ⊢ φ, as desired.
Now we turn to showing Tn ⊢ In(MSn + Iso(self) + M(self)), for arbitrary 1 ≤ n ∈ N.
By the Main Lemma, Tn ⊢ In(MSn + Tn), so since In fixes each formula of the language
of Tn, it suffices to show that Tn ⊢ In(Iso(self) + M(self)), for which we need to show that
Tn ⊢ Iso(self) + self ∈Mn, but this is immediate from the definition of T and M.
By ZF+Sep(LSat), the theory {σ ∈ Sent(LSat) | Tr(σ)} of truth is a set; and by the argument
starting the proof of Lemma 2.9, it is a consistent theory. So there is a definable S ∈ crsm
that models truth.5 Since S is a model of truth, the Global Reflection axioms allow us to prove
S |= GRn, for each standard natural number n. Let d < ω be the minimal number such that ♁(d),
and let c be the maximal number such that c ≤ d and S |= GRc. Note that for each standard
natural number n, we can prove n < c.
By Corollary 2.13, S expands to a definable model S ′ of Tc. So by Tc ⊢ Ic(MSc+Iso(self)+
M(self)) established above, and since Ic fixes each formula in the language of Tc, S expands to
a definable model S ′′ of MSc + Iso(self) +M(self). In particular, we can prove that S ′′ models
5This follows from the proof of Theorem 2.4.1 in [Chang & Keisler, 1990]. The key observation to see that the
model is definable is that it is essentially a Henkin-construction by recursion on an enumeration of a recursive
language and on an enumeration of the set of all recursive subsets of that language, both of which can be chosen
definable.
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Axioms of Arithmetic Absoluteness
Σ01-Absoluteness schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(Σ
PA
1 ) : ∀U ∈M
(
Mod(U , pσZFq)↔ σZF
)
Arithmetic Absoluteness schema ∀σ ∈ Sent(LPA) : ∀U ∈M
(
Mod(U , pσZFq)↔ σZF
)
Arithmetic Compositionality ∀U ∈M ∀φ(x) ∈ L+Mod
(
Mod(U , ∀.pxq(px ∈ Nq→. φ))↔
∀n ∈ NMod(U , φ(n))
)
Figure 6.1: Axioms of Arithmetic Absoluteness
MSn + Iso(self) + M(self), for each standard natural number n. Working in the meta-theory,
it follows that GRω interprets MS + Iso(self) + M(self) by an interpretation J mapping each
σ ∈ Sent(LMod) to the LSat-sentence S ′′ |= pσq.
Remark. Note the contrast that MS includes ZF+ Sep(LMod) + Rep(LMod) while GR
ω only
includes ZF+Sep(LSat). The essential reason why GR
ω interprets Rep(LMod) is that it interprets
Mod and M in the definable model S ′′, and that the interpretation Ic (used to construct S ′′)
maps Mod and M to the L-formulae Modc and Mc, respectively.
6 Case studies
This section looks at how the semantic framework introduced above can be applied to two rather
different conceptions of the set-theoretic multiverse.
6.1 Multiverse conceptions of arithmetical absoluteness
It is natural to view finitude, infinity and higher infinities as notions on a scale from unprob-
lematic to more problematic. Accordingly, one may feel confident in adopting a universe view
on arithmetic, appealing to the general acceptance of an intended model consisting of the finite
cardinals, while having a multiverse view of set theory, where agreement on an intended model
is lacking. This subsection therefore explores how the techniques of this paper may be applied
to multiverse conceptions where arithmetic is more or less fixed throughout the multiverse.
Let LPA be the language of arithmetic, and let ΣPAn be the usual complexity hierarchy of
arithmetic formulae over PA. Given φ ∈ LPA, φZF denotes the L-formula N |= pφq. Figure 6.1
exhibits axioms of Arithmetic Absoluteness of increasing strength.
Proposition 6.1. CM+ Arithmetic Compositionality ⊢ Arithmetic Absoluteness schema
Proof. Let σ ∈ Sent(LPA), such that σZF. Then N |= σ. Unraveling the recursive definition
of |=, we find that σZF ↔ σ′, where σ′ is obtained from σ by replacing each quantifier Qx by
Qx ∈ N and each constant and function symbol of PA by the formula defining it in the definition
of the standard model N. Let U ∈ M. We show by induction on the syntactic structure that
Mod(U , pσ′q)↔ σ′. For atomic sentences it follows from that arithmetic equations are decidable.
For the propositional connectives, the induction step follows from the CM-axioms; let us look at
σ′ ≡ ¬φ for example:
Mod(U , p¬φq)⇔ ¬Mod(U , pφq)⇔ ¬φ
The first equivalence holds by CM¬ and the second by the induction hypothesis. For the quantifier
case, suppose that σ′ ≡ ∀x ∈ N φ(x). We calculate:
Mod(U , p∀x ∈ N φ(x)q)⇔ ∀n ∈ NMod(U , pφ(n)q)⇔ ∀n ∈ N φ(n)⇔ σ′
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The first equivalence holds by Arithmetic Compositionality, the second by the induction hypoth-
esis, and the third by the fact that for all n ∈ N, N |= n = n.
The following proposition shows the reflexive power of Arithmetic Absoluteness, and exhibits
a scenario where CONEC is useful.
Proposition 6.2. CM+Σ01-Absoluteness+ CONEC ⊢ R
ωCK
1
Proof. By CONEC it suffices to prove Tr(R.
ωCK
1 ). Naturally, we do so by transfinite induction.
For the successor case, assume that Tr(R.
α) for some α < ωCK1 . Suppose U ∈ M, let σ ∈ L
and assume that Mod(U , pPrR.α(σ)q). Since α is recursive, PrR.α is Σ
0
1, so by Σ
0
1-Absoluteness,
we have PrR.α(σ). It now follows from Tr
(R.
α) and the Soundness Lemma that Mod(U , pσq). So
by CM→, we have Mod(U ,R.
α+1), as desired. The limit case is immediate from the definition of
Rα.
Remark: Even though CM+Σ01-Absoluteness+CONEC proves a fair amount of reflection, it
is not clear to the authors whether it proves Non-Triviality, i.e. that there is a universe. Given
that circumstance, it is curious that the above proof argues on an arbitrary universe.
Question 6.3. Can the techniques of this paper be used to establish the consistency (strength)
of combinations of semantical multiverse theories and axioms of arithmetic absoluteness? For
example:
(a) Is CM+Σ01-Absoluteness+ CONEC consistent relative to R
ωCK
1 ?
(b) Is MS(Lself) + Self-Representation+ Arithmetic Compositionality consistent?
The following Proposition may be viewed as a partial answer to this question, but the authors
do not consider it to suggest an ultimately negative answer to the question of consistency:
Proposition 6.4. Let Lu be L augmented with a fresh constant symbol u. The system CM(Lu)+
Arithmetic Compositionality+M(u) + NEC is ω-inconsistent.
Proof. This is a corollary of McGee’s theorem, and is proved analogously, see e.g. Theorem 13.9
in [Halbach, 2014].
6.2 The Hamkins multiverse
In [Hamkins, 2012] and [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010] (the former appearing to have been conceived
prior to the latter) a conception of the set-theoretic multiverse is axiomatized, which in summary
is based on three over-arching principles:
1. The multiverse is a non-empty collection of models of ZFC.
2. The set-theoretic multiverse is closed under the usual techniques for constructing models
of set theory from other models of set theory, such as forcing extensions and inner models.
3. Every universe is countable and ω-non-standard from the perspective of another universe.
We write HM (Hamkins’s Multiverse theory) for the theory obtained by extending ZFC with
all these axioms, as they would be naturally formulated in the language of ZFC augmented with
the predicate M for the multiverse. The third principle is of course more controversial than
the first two. For example, the Wellfoundedness Mirage axiom states that for every universe
27
U there is a universe V which thinks U is ω-non-standard [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010, p. 476].
Philsophical argmuents for the axioms are provided in [Hamkins, 2012].
Gitman and Hamkins extended the axioms with a fourth group of axioms following a sugges-
tion of Reitz, formalizing the idea that “we should be able to iterate large cardinal embeddings
backward” [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010, p. 476]. In [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010], a model of all
these axioms is constructed, essentially taking the multiverse to consist of the countable recur-
sively saturated models of ZFC. We call this the Gitman-Hamkins model of the multiverse.
[Gitman & Hamkins, 2010] considers a weak and strong form of the Wellfoundedness Mirage
axiom. In the terminology of this paper, these are formally stated as follows:
WMweak ∀U ∈M ∃V ∈M ∃u ∈ V
(
uV = U∧
∧V |= “u is ω-non-standard”
)
WMstrong ∀U ∈M ∃V ∈M ∃u ∈ V
(
uV = U∧
∧V |= “u is an ω-non-standard model of ZFC”
)
The distinction between the axioms is discussed in [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010, pp. 479-480],
where a reflection assumption is introduced to ensure that the stronger axiom gets validated
in the model. Their multiverse conception is flat in the sense that it does not consider the
universes as themselves being models of the multiverse axioms. However, the move from WMweak
toWMstrong may naturally be viewed as a step in that direction. Accordingly, we may reformulate
Wellfounded Mirage as follows:
WM ∀U ∈M ∃V ∈M ∃u ∈ V
(
uV = U∧
∧Mod(V , “u is an ω-non-standard model in M”)
)
Note that over CM + Choice+ NEC, we get WMstrong from WM, and we also get iterated forms
of WM, starting with ∀W ∈ MMod(W ,WM). The authors take this to be a natural way for
Wellfounded Mirage to manifest in a Hamkins style multiverse.
Since the semantic framework of this paper is meant to be applicable to a wide range
of multiverse conceptions, it is natural to ask about the consistency of HM + MS(Lself) +
Self-Representation. It is striking that the choice ofMn used to validate the axiom of Self-Representation
in Theorem 5.6 is the collection of countable recursively saturated models, just as in the Gitman-
Hamkins model of the multiverse. A natural way to attempt proving the above consistency
statement is therefore to use the construction from the proof of Theorem 5.6, setting up the
revision parameters T,M,Mod0 so that for each n ∈ N:
Tn = SR
n(ZFC)
Mn+1 = {U | U |= Tn ∧ U↾L∈ crsm}
Conjecture 6.5. GRω(ZFC) interprets HM+MS(Lself) + Self-Representation.
Proving this conjecture falls outside the scope of this paper. We know from Theorem 5.6
that GRω interprets MS(Lself) + Self-Representation. What remains is essentially to verify that
the proof of the Main Theorem of [Gitman & Hamkins, 2010, p. 481] generalizes from models of
ZFC to models of SRn(ZFC) (in such a way that NEC and CONEC are ultimately admitted).
7 Conclusion
We have developed a semantic framework for the multiverse of set theory, with two sides: A
revision-semantical construction of an increasingly adequate definition of truth-in-a-universe,
28
and an axiomatic theory of multiverse semantics validated by the revision construction. We
have shown how the construction can be adjusted, by tuning the revision-parameters, in order
to validate various multiverse axioms.
The basic theory of multiverse semantics is CM, which extends ZF with axioms expressing
that truth-in-a-universe is compositional with respect to the logical connectives and quantifiers.
Adding the deductive rule of NEC yields a system respecting the Copernican Principle that
whatever is proved in the multiverse theory is also justified to hold in each universe. Adding also
the dual principle of CONEC, yields the system MS. MS is in a sense analogous to the Friedman-
Sheard theory of truth (FS), but in Theorem 5.1 we saw that, unlike FS, it is conservative over
the base theory (under the meta-theoretic assumption that ZF admits the reflection rule or that
there is an ω-standard model of ZF).
Taking a natural interpretation of the modal operators into consideration, we saw two avenues
open for extending CM+NEC: The first is to add the axiom schema 4, from which we can validate
K4 and even GL. This multiverse theory was shown to be conservative over ZF. But it was also
shown to be inconsistent with the existence of a universe. The other avenue we explored was
to add axioms of a reflexive character, asserting that the universe of the background semantical
multiverse theory is to some degree represented in the multiverse: Non-trivility just says that
there is a universe in the multiverse; Multiverse Reflection can be viewed as expressing that every
formula in the base language, that holds in the background universe, also holds in some universe;
Self-Representation goes as far as expressing that the background universe is isomorphic to a
universe in the multiverse. These axioms were validated in systems of various types of iterated
reflection over ZF, all of which are very mild in terms of proof-theoretic strength.
Having this framework available, the multiverse theorist can proceed to make use of its
untyped relation of truth-in-a-universe. Apart from the light it sheds on the axioms above, a
concrete value added, compared to the usual |=-relation, is that it makes it possible to express
multiverse principles that reach arbitrarily deep into the structure of universes, universes in
universes, universes in universes in universes, etc. Let us close on this note, with words from
Tomas Transtrmer’s poem “Romanska bgar” (translation by Robert Bly):
Inne i dig ppnar sig valv bakom valv ondligt.
Du blir aldrig frdig, och det r som det skall.
Inside you one vault after another opens endlessly.
You’ll never be complete, and that’s as it should be.
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